A picture of Basic Hussein Yazdanpanah, chief of the Kurdistan Freedom Birthday party (PAK), an armed Kurdish faction lively in Iraq and Iran. (Supply: X/@Danale)
Govt Abstract:
Iran has persisted to release drone and missile assaults towards exiled Iranian Kurdish militants founded in Iraqi Kurdistan following the U.S.–Iranian ceasefire signed on April 8.
Tehran is closely pressuring Iraqi Kurdish government to both expel those militant teams or give up their leaders.
An enduring U.S.–Iranian settlement missing explicit protections for Kurds would most probably depart those militants extremely at risk of critical Iranian retaliation and compelled elimination.
The U.S.–Iranian ceasefire was once first introduced on April 8 (UN, April 9). Since April 8, assaults at the U.S. Consulate Basic construction and the coalition base on the airport in Iraqi Kurdistan have halted. Assaults on Iranian Kurdish militant teams have, alternatively, persisted.
9 participants of Iranian Kurdish militant teams were killed since February 28, together with 4 after the ceasefire (Substack/Wladimir van Wilgenburg, April 17). On Would possibly 25, 9 participants of the Kurdistan Freedom Birthday party (PAK) have been additionally injured in assaults (PAK, Would possibly 25). In step with Neighborhood Peacemaker Groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, 77 p.c of assaults since April 8 in Iraqi Kurdistan have been performed through Iran and its proxies towards Iranian Kurdish militants (CPT, Would possibly 26).
Iranian Army Operations
Iran has further causes to focus on Iranian Kurdish opposition events. A number of media stories since March instructed that Israel and the US thought to be supporting Iraqi Kurdistan-based Iranian Kurdish militants towards the Iranian regime all over the war (CNN, March 4; New York Occasions, Would possibly 19). In reaction, Iran has stepped up executions, together with towards Kurds (The New Area, Would possibly 21; Asharq al-Awsat, Would possibly 25).
U.S. President Donald Trump has additionally accused Kurds of stealing guns, an allegation each Iranian and Iraqi Kurds have denied (Center East Eye, April 6; The New Area, Would possibly 24). Trump first of all subsidized the theory of the use of Iranian Kurds to power the Iranian regime, and after the April 8 ceasefire, Iran claimed that Kurdish teams in Iraqi Kurdistan have been looking to smuggle U.S. guns into Iran (Reuters, April 8; AFP, Would possibly 19). Nonetheless, the Iranian Kurdish militants don’t seem to have performed any contemporary assaults towards Iran.
Former Kurdistan Loose Existence Birthday party (PJAK) member Shamal Bishir said that,
“I think these kinds of attacks [by Iran] will probably keep increasing even if the [United States] and Iran reach a deal. Trump’s comments about changing the map of Iran, supporting Kurdish groups, and similar ideas have put the Iranian Kurdish parties in a really complicated position, stuck between a rock and a hard place. The whole idea of potentially involving Iranian Kurdish groups in a war against Iran seems to have pushed Tehran toward wanting to settle the issue once and for all.” [1]
Diplomatic Recourse
Iran may be making use of higher diplomatic power to curtail the actions of Iranian Kurdish militants. On April 8, the Iranian Consulate in Erbil referred to as at the Kurdistan Regional Govt (KRG) to expel Iranian Kurdish opposition teams, accusing them of ties to Israel and the US (The New Area, Would possibly 25). Later, on Would possibly 24, Iraq’s Nationwide Safety Marketing consultant Qasim al-Araji introduced {that a} joint safety delegation from Baghdad and Erbil would go back and forth to Tehran to talk about the 2023 Iran–Iraq border safety settlement (Shafaq, April 24).
That settlement was once supposed to transport Iranian Kurdish militants clear of the border. Quds Pressure commander Esmail Qaani, alternatively, reportedly issued new calls for for the KRG to expel Iraqi Kurdistan-based Iranian Kurdish militant teams. He additionally demanded the KRG give up their leaders to Iran on his Would possibly consult with to Iraqi Kurdistan (Kurdistan Watch, Would possibly 26).
Conclusion
The stateless Kurds are obviously weaker than the Iranian regime within the present setting. Whilst Iran has driven for any handle the US to incorporate a ceasefire in Lebanon to give protection to its best friend Hezbollah, the US has now not driven for a ceasefire in Iraqi Kurdistan. World silence over Iranian assaults on Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan contrasts with the reaction to persisted Iranian assaults at the United Arab Emirates and different Gulf international locations (Al Jazeera, Would possibly 5).
In step with Hana Yazdanpana, a member of PAK’s international members of the family division,
“If an agreement is reached without guarantees for the protection of the Kurds or a ban on any aggression against neighboring regions, then undoubtedly the people, the authorities of the Kurdistan Region, and the parties of East Kurdistan [Western Iran] will become victims.” [2]
Must the US succeed in an everlasting settlement with Iran, U.S. air-defense programs and fighter jets may forestall intercepting Iranian assaults at the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan. The U.S.-led coalition may be anticipated to withdraw from Iraqi Kurdistan through September 2026 (The New Area, December 31, 2025). So far, interceptions have helped prohibit Kurdish casualties in comparison with earlier Iranian assaults in Iraqi Kurdistan. As an example, a unmarried Iranian missile strike at the Democratic Birthday party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) in 2018 killed no less than 11 folks (Al Jazeera, September 8, 2018). In contrast, regardless of loads of Iranian assaults all over the present war, handiest 9 Iranian Kurdish celebration participants were killed because the finish of February.
A U.S.–Iran settlement that avoids point out of Iranian Kurds is more likely to have instant repercussions for the crowd. A loss of sustained global consideration may now not handiest position Iranian Kurdish militants at critical possibility of Iranian retaliation but additionally building up power on Erbil and Baghdad to take away them from Iraqi Kurdistan to steer clear of Iranian airstrikes (Arab Weekly, Would possibly 20).
This newsletter was once at the start revealed in Terrorism Track.
Notes:
[1] Writer’s interview with former PJAK member Shamal Bishir, April 1, 2026.
[2] Writer’s interview with Hana Yazdanpana, a member of PAK’s international members of the family division.
